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There is more than one price policy in a spatial market.  Three main spatial price 
policies are: (1) uniform mill price under which the seller chooses a constant f.o.b. 
price and transportation costs are paid by consumers; (2) spatial price discrimination
(hereafter, SPD) under which different and location-specific prices are selected over 
space; and (3) uniform delivered price policy (UDP) under which consumers at 
different market sites pay the same delivered price.  Among these price polices, price 
discrimination is treated by antitrust authorities of many countries being illegal per se,
but uniform mill price is often appealing because of “its imitation of the spatial 
structure of marginal costs” (Hobbs, 1986).  Perhaps because of this, much efforts in 
the literature has been devoted to the socially superiority of SPD as compared with 
uniform mill price.1  The main conclusion hereupon is that in some cases, SPD is 
socially preferable as compared with uniform mill price.  This implies that as 
compared with uniform mill price, the social superiority of SPD is model specific.
Uniform delivered pricing is also appealing as compared with SPD, and often 
tolerated by antitrust authorities.  But there is a paucity of research that seeks to 
provide a theoretical justification for firms practicing UDP, another type of 
                                                
1 The first attempt to examine the economic benefit of movement from SPD to uniform mill price is 
made by Greenhut and Ohta (1972) with the focus on monopoly output, and Holahan (1975) then 
extends the analysis to include some additional economic benefit comparisons such as profits, 
aggregate consumers’ benefit, and social welfare.  Subsequent researches revisited the issue by 
relaxing some of assumptions postulated by Greenhut and Ohta (1972) and Holahan (1975), 
including (GHO1) consumers are uniformly distributed over the space; (GHO2) the market area, the 
space the firm actually serves, is endogenously determined by the prices charged (hereafter the 
variable market area case); (GHO3) demands at different site are identical and linear, (GHO4) the 
firm’s mill is pre-determined, and (GHO5) the firm is a monopolist.  In the famous paper, 
Beckmann (1976) relaxed (GHO1) by (B2), but assumed instead (B3).  Hsu (1983a) examined the 
spatial setting in which both (GHO2) and (B3) are possible. Some studies relaxed (GHO3) by 
assuming identical demands being nonlinear (see, for example, Hsu (1979), Greenhut (1977), Ohta 
and Wako(1988)) while some recent attempts are to relax (GHO4) by that the firm’s location is an 
endogenous choice, including Hwang and Mai (1990), and Claycombe (1996).
discrimination.2  Only two papers, as far as we know, appeared in the literature, but 
their conclusions are in sharply contrasted.  In the pioneering paper, Beckmann 
(1976) shows that (BC1) the movement from UDP to SPD has no monopoly output 
effect; and (BC2) the firm’s profits, consumers’ benefits and social welfare all are 
greater under SPD than those under UDP. These results are in sharp contrast to the 
common wisdom that UDP is more socially preferable since in appearance, 
discrimination under UDP appears less serious.  Nevertheless, Tan (2001) has 
recently shown instead that UDP is socially superior to SPD in a model3 differing 
from Beckmann (1976). In other words, the social desirability of UDP, as compared 
to SPD, is model specific, too.  
The model examined by Beckmann (1976) is the conventional one in the 
literature of spatial price theory.  Nevertheless, it consists of a set of assumptions, 
including (B1) demand is identical and linear;  (B2) the spatial consumer distribution 
can be of any form; (B3) the extent of the market areas-- the boundary of the space 
over which the firm actually serves--are exogenously fixed and same under alternative 
price policies, (hereafter, the fixed market area assumption); and (B4) competition is 
insignificant.  The cautious reader might then wander whether the above-mentioned 
findings by Beckmann (1976) is justifiable in a more general content.   This paper 
attempts to re-examine the issue in a generalized model of Beckmann (1976).  Much 
is to say, this paper relax assumptions (B3) and (B4) but keeps (B1) in order to 
highlight the pure impact of economic space.
                                                
2 In the literature, some efforts have been devoted to the study of resultant economic benefits of 
another pair of price policies, namely, uniform mill price and UDP (See, for example, Beckmann 
(1976), Hsu (1983b), and Cheung and Wang (1996))
3 To be precise, Tan (2001), similar to Hwang and Mai (1990), attempts to re-confirm one of 
conclusions made in a excellent review paper by Beckmann and Thisse (1986, p. 69), namely that 
the social superiority of one price policy maybe altered when the firm chooses its price policy and 
plant location simultaneously.  Moreover, Tan’s above-mentioned result holds only for cases that 
the constant transport rate is rather small (see Table 4 in Tan (2001) and the relevant discussion 
hereupon).
        The organization of this paper is as follows:  In Section 1, we first present the 
basic model.  The model is same as that studied by Beckmann (1976) except that the 
fixed market area assumption, that is, (B3), is relaxed.  We assume instead that the
market size— the length of the space over which consumers are dispersed— can take 
various values.  We show that the extent of the market area maybe determined 
exogenously by the fixed market size, or endogenously by the price charged, 
depending on the size of market.  In Section 2, we first derive the optimal prices and 
market areas of alternative pricing policies, and then explore their properties.  Efforts 
of Section 3 are devoted to the economic benefit effects of movement from SPD to 
UDP.  We show that the finding (BC2) by Beckmann (1976) holds despite of the 
length of the market size, but (BC1) cannot hold in some cases.  In Section 4, we 
examine the issue in a world without the assumption (B4), namely, the case of spatial 
competition under free entry--a neglected aspect in the literature of spatial price 
theory.  We show that neither (BC1) nor (BC2) remain true when competition is so 
significant as to drive the firm’s profit to zero.  Some concluding remarks are 
provided in Section 5.
1. Basic Model
       Consider a line market in which a spatial monopolist sells a homogeneous 
product subject to a strictly positive and constant freight, say t .  The consumer’s 
demand is linear: 
(1)           bpapfxq -== )()( ,
where x denotes distance from the seller's mill, )(xq = the quantity demanded at 
the market site x , and p = the delivered price, the amount a consumer shall pay for 
a unit of commodity.  Marginal cost of production, say c, is constant. Thus, the firm's 
profit under SPD, dp , is
(2)        FdxxrpfcmdBd --ò= )()()(0p
where dB = the boundary of the market area under SPD, txpm -= = the mill price, 
that is, the amount the seller can receive by selling one unit of product, and F = total 
fixed costs.  On the other hand, the profit under UDP, up  is:
(3)      Fdxxxqtxcpu
B
u
u ---ò= )()]()[(0 gp Fdxxtxcppf u
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u
u ---ò= )()()( 0 g
where up = the uniform delivered price charged under UDP, and uB = the boundary
of the market area under UDP.
      About the extent of the market area, the fixed market area assumption 
postulated by Beckmann (1976) is that ud BB = .  Another specification in the 
literature of spatial price theory is that the extent of the market area is endogenously 
determined by the price charged (see, for example, Beckmann (1968), Greenhut and 
Ohta (1972), and Holahan (1975)).  Thus, the following relationship holds at the 
market boundary point under SPD
(4)       0)()()( max =-== BbpapfBq ,
where maxp = the reservation price--the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay 
for a unit of commodity, and )(Bp = the delivered price charged at the market 
boundary under SPD.  Based on the belief that a consumer will refuse to buy any 
quantity if the selling price is more than the maximum he is willing to pay, the above 
relation tells us that, under mill price, the market area equals the distance from his site 
to the point at which the delivered price equals the consumer’s reservation price.
Instead, the profit-maximizing UDP firm will refuse to sell beyond the market point at 
which the amount he receives for a unit of commodity equals the average variable 
cost (Beckmann (1968), and Hsu (1983b)).  Thus, the following relation is used to 
determine the boundary of the market area under UDP
(5)        0)( =-- tBcpu .
In the real world, the firm often confronts a spatial market over which 
consumers are dispersed within a finite length.  It is worthy pointing out that in a 
market with varying size, (3) or (5) might over-estimate the extent of the market area.  
What (3) actually states is that once we know specific form of demand, costs of 
transportation and production, and the optimal price, the value of B can then be 
determined, regardless of whether there are any consumers locating at those market 
sites, and so does (5).  It is clear that if there is no buyer at those market sites, the 
extent of the market area should equal the market size S .  Accordingly, the 
following rule should be used to determine the extent of the market area
(6)       ),min( ii SSB = ,
where iS  stands for the distance satisfying (3) and (5) respectively under alternative 
pricing policies.  Moreover, for any extent of market size, the equality holds for SPD:
(7)     0)/)](([ =¶¶ mBBpf
and for UDP,
(8)      )/)(( uu pBtBcp ¶¶--
2. Optimal Pr ices and Market Areas
The marginal profit under UDP is
(9)     )/)(()()()()('/
00
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where the second equality is based on (8).  Thus, the optimal price under UDP is:
(10)     xtffcpu +-= '/
where u
B Ndxxxx u /)(0 gò= .  The term x  is the simple spatial mean of consumer 
distribution, or the average distance since dxxN uBu )(0 gò= , the total population 
served by the firm under UDP, and uNx /)(g  is the probability density of consumer 
locating over space.  For our case of linear demand, the optimal delivered price 
under UDP is:
(11)     bxbtbcapu 2/)( ++=
By substituting (11) in (5), we find
(12)     uS 2/2/)( xbtbca +-=
A function of mill prices is chosen to maximize profits under SPD.  
Since the first derivative of dm  with respect to the distance, that is, dxdmd / , does 
not enter the integrand in (2), the variation problem is equivalent to an unconstrained 
classical programming problem.  Thus, the optimal mill price schedule under SPD 
derived from the first-order condition of the optimization can be generally expressed 
as4
(13)     )('/)( ddd pfpfcm -=
where txmp dd += = the optimal delivered price schedule under SPD.  In the case 
of linear demand, one find:
(14)   bbtxbcamd 2/)( -+=
By substituting (14) in (4), we find:
(15)       btbcaSd /)( -=
     Consider first the extent of the market area under alternative pricing policies.  
Note first that 0)(2/2/)( >=--=- xmxbtbcaSS dfd  where )(xmd  = the mill 
price charged at the market site xx =  under SPD.  It follows that 
(16)      ud BB >  when uSS > 2/2/)( xbtbca +-=
(17)      ud BB =  if and only if uSS £
Equation (16) indicates that in a market with varying size, the fixed market area 
assumption made by Beckmann (1976), in turn, requires the market is small, that is, 
                                                
4 The formal derivation is available upon request from the author
uSS £ .  On the other hand, if the market is not small, then the firm serves a larger 
market area under SPD than it would be under UDP.
     The optimal prices under two pricing policies can be depicted as Figure 1.  
Both delivered prices under alternative pricing policies are equal at the market site 
xx = .  Thus, fd pp ³  accordingly as xx £ , and vise versa (see Figure 1).  That 
is, relative to UDP, SPD imposes a welfare loss on nearby buyers in the region  ( x , 
dB ), and results in a welfare gain on buyers in region (0, x ).  Moreover, when the 
market is not small as Beckmann’s, SPD results in extra welfare gains by serving new 
buyers in region ( fS , dB ) (see Figure 1).
3. Economic Benefits
Consider first the total output sold, or monopoly output--the first measure 
used in the literature of spatial price theory to evaluate the economic benefit effect of 
movement from UMP to SPD.  It can generally be defined for linear demand by 
dxxrbpaQ B )()(0 -ò= .  Thus, for SPD
(18)       dxxrbtxbcaQ dBd )()2/2/2/(0 --ò=
and for UDP,
(19)      dxxxbtbcaQ
uB
ou
)()2/2/2/( g--= ò
By utilizing the definition the average distance, Equation (18) can be rewritten as
(20)       dxxbtxbcaQ
uB
ou
)()2/2/2/( g--= ò .
Thus, the difference in monopoly outputs between SPD and UDP is:
(21)      dxxrbtxbcaQQDQ d
u
B
Bud )()2/2/2/( --ò=-= .
Equation (21) indicates that SPD yields a larger monopoly output than UDP if and 
only if it enlarges the extent of the market area.  If the market is small, then ud BB = , 
and thereby, one obtains the finding hereupon by Beckmann (1776).  One the other 
hand, if the extent of the market size is uSS > , then ud BB > , and thereby, ud QQ > .  
Formally, 
PROPOSITION 1: When individual demand is linear, monopoly output is greater 
under SPD than it would be under UDP only if it enlarges the extent of the market 
area or the market size is large.
Proposition 1 shows that the output effect of SPD as compared to UDP, shown by 
Beckmann (1976) cannot remain valid in a large market
     Another measure to evaluate the economic benefit effects of SPD in the 
literature of spatial price theory is social welfare, the sum of consumers’ surplus and 
profits.  Consumers’ surplus as a whole can generally be defined for linear demand 
by dxxrbbpaCS fB )()2/1()( 20 -ò= .  Accordingly, for SPD
(22)      dxxrbbtxbcaCS dBd )()8/1()(
2
0 --ò=
and for UDP,
(23)     dxxrbxbtbcaCS fBu )()8/1()( 20 --ò= .
By utilizing the definition of the average distance, (23) can be rewritten as 
(24)     uCS dxxrxxbtbtxbcabu
B )()]()[8/1( 20 -+--ò=
               )8/)(()())(8/1( 220 btNxVardxxrbtxbcab u
B f +--ò=              
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            )8/)(()())(8/1( 220 btNxVardxxrbtxbcab u
B f +--ò=             
dxxrxxxxbtfB )())()(8/(2 20 -+-ò+
)8/)(()())(8/1( 220 btNxVardxxrbtxbcab u
B f ---ò=
where f
B NdxxrxxxVar f /)(*)()( 20 -ò= .  The term )(xVar in (24) is nothing but 
the spatial variance of buyer density, or the variability of distance since it is defined 
by the second moment about the mean of x, exactly the same as the variance in 
statistics.  Thus, the difference in aggregate consumers’ surplus of two pricing 
policies is:
(25)     )8/()2/( GACSCSDCS ud -=-=
where dxxrbtxbcabA d
u
B
B )())(4/1(
2--ò= .  It is clear that when the market size is 
small as that imposed by Beckmann (1976), then 08/ <-= GDCS
        Consider next the firm’s preference.  By substituting (14) in (2), the firms’ profit 
under SPD is:
(26)       FdxxrbtxbcabdBd ---ò= )())(4/1(
2
0p .
Similarly, the firm’s profit under UDP is:
(27)       dxxxtcbabatxxtcbau
B
u )()]2/2/2/()[2/2/2/(0 gp ++--+-= ò
By utilizing the definitions of the average distance and spatial variance, (27) becomes
(27’)     dxxxbtbcabtxxbtbcabu
B
u )())(2)(4/1(0 gp ---+-= ò
     dxxxxbtbtxbcaxxbtbtxbcabu
B
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Accordingly, the difference in the firm’s profit of two pricing policies is:
(28)      AGD ud +=-= )4/(ppp  > 0
Therefore, the welfare difference between SPD and UDP is:
(29)      0)8/()2/3( >+=-= GAWWDW ud
     Equation (29) holds for any shape of spatial consumer distribution.  It holds 
also despite of the extent of the market size since 08/ >= GDW  when the market 
size is small and 0. >A  for a large market.  Accordingly, we can conclude 
PROPOSITION 2: When demand is linear, SPD is socially superior to UDP, despite 
of both the shape of the spatial consumer density and the extent of the market size.
Proposition 2 generalizes the finding obtained with the fixed market area assumption 
by Beckmann (1976) to any extent of the market size.  
4. Spatial Competition
        To justify the finding obtained by Beckmann (1976) in a market with the 
assumption that competition is insignificant, we consider the case of spatial 
competition under free entry.  It is one of oft-studied topics in the literature of spatial 
price theory (see, for example, Holahan (1975), Capozza and Van Order (1978), and 
Gronberg and Meyer (1981)), and the focus has been on that entry drives the firm’s 
profits to zero, the so-called zero-profit equilibrium.
There is no difference in the firm’s profits under alternative pricing policies at 
zero-profit equilibrium under spatial competition.  It follows from (28) that the value 
A must be negative of G  is always positive, that of G  is always positive.  This, 
in turn, requires that ud BB < , and 4/GA -= .  Thus, the monopoly output is 
greater under UMP than that under SPD (see (20)).  Moreover, it follows from (24) 
and (29) together with 4/GA -=  that 8/3GDCS -= , and 2/GDW -= .  
Therefore, we can conclude
PROPOSITION 3: In zero-profit equilibrium under spatial competition, UMP is 
social superior to SPD, in terms of monopoly output, consumers’ surplus as a whole 
or social welfare. 
Proposition 3 shows that both Beckmann’s (BC1) and (BC2) cannot hold when 
competition is significant.  Note also that Proposition 3 holds for any shape of spatial 
consumer distribution. 
5. Concluding Remarks
     We have found in a generalized model of Beckmann (1976) that when a spatial 
monopoly is free from competition, social welfare is greater under discriminatory
pricing than it would be under uniform delivered pricing for any shape of the spatial 
consumer density with various market sizes.  Spatial price discrimination can also 
result in larger monopoly output than uniform delivered pricing when it serves larger 
market area.  This, as shown in this paper, is the case that the market size is not small 
as that postulated by Beckmann (1976).  Nevertheless, in regions where competition 
is so significant as to drive the firm’s profits to zero, uniform delivered pricing is 
always social superior to discriminatory pricing, either in terms of monopoly output, 
consumers’ surplus or social welfare.  This result holds for any shape of buyer 
density.  The findings of this paper, we believe, may provide the theoretical 
justification for antitrust authorities-- their main job is to promote competition--often 
appealing uniform delivered pricing as compared to spatial price discrimination.
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